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1. INTRODUCTION 
We are interested in creating an automated or semi-automated system with the 
capability of taking a set of radar imagery, collection parameters and a priori map and 
other tactical data, and producing likely interpretations of the possible military situa­
tions given the available evidence. This paper is concerned with the problem of the 
interpretation and computation of certainty or belief in the conclusions reached by such 
a system. For example, if we consider the problem of confirming or denying the presence 
of a battalion in a given area, we should include in our decision making process the prior 
likelihood of military presence based on tactical objectives, the evidence of military vehi­
cles in radar image data, the spatial and tactical clustering and patterns of the vehicles 
extracted from the imagery, etc. Furthermore, if the user of the system has particular 
interests such as knowing specific deployments, location of battalion headquarters, etc., 
then these interests should also be responded to in certainty computations. 
In this report, we begin by briefly summarizing these functions from the point of 
view of outlining the inference processes that such a system must perform. Inference is 
performed over a space of hierarchically linked hypotheses. The hypotheses typically 
(although not solely) represent statements of the form "There is a military force of type 
F in deployment D at world location L at time T " . The hierarchy in the hypothesis 
space corresponds to the hierarchy inherent in military doctrine of force structuring. 
Thus, "array-level" hypotheses of military units such as companies, artillery batteries, 
and missile sites, are linked to their component unit hypotheses of vehicles batteries and 
missile launchers. Similarly, companies are grouped to form battalion hypotheses, bat­
talions to form regiments, etc. 
The hypotheses are formed by (hierarchical and partial) matching of military force 
models to evidence available in radar imagery. Thus, we are actually concerned with a 
model-based radar vision system. Evidence of the truth (or denial) of a hypothesis is 
accrued numerically from probabilistic estimates about the sub-hypotheses that comprise 
their parent hypothesis according to the hierarchical military force models in which the 
vehicle level hypotheses correspond to the leaf-nodes of the hierarchy. In this report, we 
only address the symbolic inference problem, under the assumption that probabilities of 
vehicle level hypotheses have already been computed. The vehicle level hypotheses are 
inferred from evidence supplied by radar image understanding algorithms applied to the 
radar data. These computations require radar modeling and development of a proba­
bilistic certainty calculus, but these issues are not addressed here. See [Levitt et al., -
86a] for an example of certainty calculus design at the vehicle level. 
I 
Summarizing so far, the proposed certainty calculus is a computational method for 
associating numerical probabilities to conclusions reached by a model-based radar vision 
system applied to problems of military situation assessment. A fundamental concept 
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here is that, while v1s1on system processing may be complex, with numerous feedback 
loops, multiple levels of resolution, recursion, etc., in the end we should be able to associ­
ate a deductive chain of evidence to a system output, along with an associated numerical 
belief that supports that result. The system concept is pictured in Figure l. 
We seleCted probability theory as the underlying technology for this numerical 
accrual of evidence. This approach requires us to lay out, a priori, the links between evi­
dence and hypotheses in the models over which the system will reason. Having laid out 
these links, we then need a numerical interpretation of the conditional belief (i.e., proba­
bility) in a hypothesis given chains of evidence that support it through links. This is 
similar to the propagation networks of Pearl [Pearl - 85], to influence diagrams [Howard 
and �1atheson - 80], and other probabilistic accrual models such as those of [Kelly and 
Barclay - 73], [Schum - 77, 80], and [Schum and Martin - 82]. Besides explicit declara­
tion of evidence/hypothesis links, these approaches also require development of numeri­
cal accrual formula to capture the semantics of the links, and elicitation of a priori pro­
babilities. However, a certainty calculus for perceptually based military situation assess­
ment addresses additional issues not directly faced in these approaches. 
In the aforementioned schemes, the network, influence diagram, etc. typically 
represents exactly one model at a single level of abstraction. (Pearl has extended his 
work to hierarchies [Pearl - 86], however, previous applications of his theory have not 
been hierarchical in nature. Schum's work is also hierarchical, but both are still con­
cerned with a single model.) For eJCample, a model might represent the chains of evidence 
from symptoms to disease for a diagnosis system. The model is "instantiated" for a sin­
gle patient; the evidence flows through, and (numerical) conclusions are inferred. Con­
ceptually we perform exactly one pattern match of a single model against a data set 
known to represent a unique instance (i.e., one person). 
In this application there are multiple models linked hierarchically in multiple levels 
of abstraction. We have a basic (ascending) "part-of" hierarchy of military forces: 
"vehicle, part-of, company, part-of, battalion, part-of, regiment, part-of, division." 
Further, at each level of this hierarchy there is an "is-a" hierarchy of military force type 
refinements. For example, at the vehicle level we have: "T-72-tank, is-a, tank, is-a, 
tracked-vehicle, is-a, vehicle." Similarly, at the array level we have: tank-company-in­
defensive deployment, is-a, tank-company, is-a, company, is-a, array." Thus, the model 
space represents multiple partial orderings at multiple resolution in both part-of and is-a 
hierarchies. (N.B. This is a well-known issue in knowledge representation in artificial 
intelligence. See, for example, [Brachman - 85).) 
The second major difference is that we dynamically (i.e., at system runtime) gen­
erate multiple matches of models to instances in the radar image data. This corresponds 
to a hypothesis space with many hypotheses, more than one of which can be correct at 
the same time, e.g., there may be two divisions on the battlefield, each of which matches 
an instance of the same division model. This second difference is especially significant. 
The generation of multiple hypotheses at runtime gives rise to: 
• the distribution of a finite amount of belief over a consistent set of hypotheses, 
and 
• the problem of distinguishing conflicting interpretation of links of evidence to 
hypotheses (i.e., bad pattern matches) from consistent sets of multiple 
hypotheses. 
The first issue is equivalent to not having a single "top level" model in the part-of 
hierarchy that bounds the n�mber of parts (i.e., evidence) that can (consistently) occur 
below it. This problem can be finessed by deciding, a priori, that no more than a single 
division (for example) can be present in the data. ln practice this sort of assumption is 
v.ery reasonable, however, if we want to extend this approach to more general vision, to 
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adapting to changing spatial tactics by commanders, or to any sort of learning system, 
the requirement for a top level model must be removed. 
The second issue is central in the current design. Conflict. resolution bet ween sets 
of hypotheses must be performed to attempt to improve the results of imperfect pattern 
matching. Matching models to the data is necessarily imperfect because, in general, 
• only part of the forces actually present will be imaged in collected imagery. 
• detection/recognition algorithms will miss some imaged vehicles, add in false 
alarms, and mis-classify some observed vehicles. 
• models are not perfect and forces do not always follow precise doctrine, so 
incorrect matches will be made even when large parts of forces are observed. 
Thus, the numerical accrual of evidence through the part-of and is-a hierarchies must 
not only account for accrual through consistent chains of inference, but also aid in 
disambiguating conflicting chains. 
Multiple, possibly conflicting, model matches in a large data space give rise to 
combinatorial nightmares. We note, however, that the calculus only specifies how 
accrual should be performed over both conflicting and consistent sets of hypotheses. 
The control of the accrual process is technically a separable issue. Multiple control 
schemes could, in principle, be exercised over the same calculus, with radically different 
combinatorial results. This point is the springboard for the introduction of a technique 
for performing. approximate hierarchical inference, while avoiding exponential processes. 
The technique presented is complementary to the (potentially expensive) conflict resolu­
tion procedures presented in [Levitt - 85] and [Levitt et al.- 86a]. 
Elicitation of highly conditional' prior probabilities and likelihoods is another 
major research area necessary to design of the probability calculus. Priors combine 
domain expertise with background information beyond the knowledge boundaries (time, 
area, types of information) for which the '' Jtomated system is responsible. We do not 
address this problem here. For a technical approach, see [Levitt et al.- 86b). 
The structure of inference follows a pattern based on the models that are matched 
to generate hypotheses of the presence of military forces on the battlefield. These 
models consist purely of force types (i.e., names) and spatial-geometric deployment data 
relating force types. Modeling of the appearance of vehicles in SAR imagery, sensor 
models, terrain models, etc. are not addressed here. As depicted in Figure l, each 
hypothesis passes on its posterior probabilities to become a priori (evidential} probabili­
ties and hypotheses for hypotheses at the next level of hierarchical inference. Thus, cer­
tainties of vehicle detections are passed to inferences of vehicle classification, which in 
turn passes certainties of vehicle classifications to array-level military unit inference 
processes, etc. In general, posteriors at one force level become priors for their parent 
forces in the military hierarchy. Contextual analysis provides prior probabilities con­
cerning a priori terrain evidence, likelihood of force presence based on a priori tactical 
considerations, as well as runtime estimates of accuracy of image-to-map registration· 
that are necessary to account for the relative locations of forces which are observed in 
different sets of imagery. 
In the following, we address the general problem of symbolic hierarchical Bayesian 
inference for military force inference. The key technical issue we address is the need to 
resolve conflicts between multiple incompatible hypotheses. The need to derive mutually 
consistent sets of (hierarchicaN hypotheses gives rise to the exponential process of creat­
ing these sets. In this report, we present a method for approximate hierarchical accrual 
that can be used to selectively avoid unnecessary conflict resolution depending on the 
system's focus of attention in processing tasks. 
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Figure 1: Hierarchical Inference Structure 
2. EVIDENTIAL ACCRUAL 
The vehicle classification process provides a hierarchy of probabilities concerning 
the hypothesis that a chip of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery contains some 
vehicle from a well defined world, W, of vehicles. All probabilities are explicitly condi­
tioned on contextual information including terrain, and radar dependent measurements, 
t ,m, provided with the chip, and upon evidence, e , extracted from t� chip. The vehi­
cle classification process apportions the probability that a vehicle is present among the 
nodes of its is-a hierarchy. This process ends a.t the leaf nodes of the tree that represent 
specific vehicle types. The fundamental problem is to estimate the probability that V 
occurs given evidence e and context m and t; that is, to compute P ( V I e ,t ,m ). This 
is a deep radar modeling issue and we do not address it in this report. In the following 
we assume this computation has been performed. 
We now address evidence accrual up the hierarchy of military force hypotheses. 
For each hypothesis, H, which is based on a model that has components, Ci, we first 
find the components which match the componen t portions of the model and their 
corresponding evidence, ei, that supports each component hypothesis C;. There is also 
a set of spatial pattern matching evidence associated with H that is specific to the 
geometric, spatial constraints that are given by the model for H. This set of evidence is 
denoted f. A hypothesis with components is then defined from the model as the 
existence of a force that is composed of the listed components C, . The evidence that 
supports the hypothesis H is defined as the and of the evidence, ei , for all of the com­
ponent hypotheses, Ci, and the new evidence, /, for the hypothesis H. Initially, the ei 
are the image data and processing results and H corresponds to a vehicle hypothesis 
based on that; evidence. At the next level of the part-of hierarchy, the array level 
matches of vehicle sets give rise to array level hypotheses, H, the vehicle hypotheses 
play the role of components of H in the part-of hierarchy, i.e., the Ci, and the image 
evidence represents the ei .  With this recursive definition the new set of evidence for the 
hypothesis H will become the evidence that' supports this hypothesis as it is used as a 
component of a yet higher level hypothesis that matches a yet higher level force model. 
We use as notation for th� conjunction of the component hypotheses, A.Ci . This 
i 
represents the statement that all of the component forces, Ci , exist. This does not 
necessarily imply that the hypothesis H exists. 
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In numerical accrual of evidence, we make several independence assumptions. The 
first is the standard hierarchical inference assumption that deals with evidence about an 
intermediate level hypothesis, C, where there is a higher level hypothesis, H, that uses 
C on the part-of hierarchy. That is, there exists evidence that infers C and then C 
infers H. The assumption is that given that C is true, the evidence, e supporting C 
and H are conditionally independent. That is P(H ,e I C) = P(H I C:) · P( e 1- C). 
The second assumption concerns the independence of evidence at various levels in 
a consistent hierarchy. If there is a hypothesis that is supported both by components 
and by inter-relations between those components, and if we assume that the hypothesis 
is true, then the evidence of the relations among the components is independent of the 
evidence for each component. This can be written as a single statement as follows. Let 
the ei 's be the evidence supporting each component for a hypothesis H; then 
P(.\.ei I H ,ACi) = rr p (ei I H ,ci) 
I I I 
Here "Aei " means the conjunction of the evidence supporting the components. 
I 
We also assume that if C is a part-of the hypothesis H, then P ( C I H) = 1. 
The next independence assumption concerns conflict recognition between 
hypotheses. If C 1, C 2 are hypotheses supported by disjoint sets of evidence e 1 and e 2 
respectively and, furthermore, C 1 and C 2 are not in military doctrinal conflict (e.g., by 
being situated too close together, facing opposite directions, etc.), then: 
P ( C 1 I e I• e 2• C 2) = P ( C 1 I e 1 ) . 
Now, if A Ci are parts-of H, and the A Ci are supported by non-conflicting evi-
l i 
dence 4 ei, then the value we need to accrue is P ( H I A Ci A ei , f , A ti ). Where 
t I I I ti is the terrain under ci , and I is a measure of the fit to formation of the ci to the 
parent hypothesis H. In doing so, we also assume that P ( ti) = I, that is, we know 
the world terrain with absolute certainty, and also that terrain is a local issue so that 
P (At, I H, ACi, Aei, J ) = Il(t, I C1 ). Csing Bayes rule under these assumptions, 
t I 
we can show that: 
·Il [ 
P ( ci I e;) P ( ci 1 tr) 
P ( ci 1 ei, t;) 
3. APPROXIMATE CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
The assumption in the previous section that P ( C 1 I e 1, e 2• C 2) = P ( C 1 \ e 1 ) 
is clearly unacceptable if either e 1 and e 2 are not disjoint, or if the truth of C 2 
conflicts for any reason with that of C 1. :-\ methodology for handling conflicts was 
presented in [Levitt - 85). The concept was to accrue non-conflicted evidence up to the 
highest level of the hierarchy, and then to form a mutually exclusive, exhaustive 
hypothesis space of maximal consistent sets of hypotheses. Results of disambiguation at 
the highest level could be passed down the hierarchy with high probability of correct 
inference. An alternative approach is presented in [Levitt et al. - 86a] where conflict 
17 1 
resolution is performed bottom-up in the accrual process by factoring in the negation of 
each hypothesis in the accrual. Both approaches suffer from an inherently worst-case 
exponential step in forming sets of consistent hypotheses. 
Here, we present a method for analyzing a conflict in polynomial time, and provide 
a metric, based on the analysis, to determine if conflict is worth dis-ambiguating. If it is 
not, then accrual must be able to "jump" over the conflicted level in the hierarchy by 
specifying how to accrue evidence at lower levels as support for higher level hypotheses. 
The concep t of conflict analysis is embodied in the case for two hypotheses. Let 
e = e 1 U e 2 U e 12 where e 1 is a. set of evidence supporting only C 1, e 2 supports 
only C 2 and e 12 is shared, conflicted evidence associated to both. Then we approxi­
mate 
P ( C 1, C 2, e ) = P ( C 1 I C 2, e ) P ( C 2 I e ) P ( e ) 
� P ( C 1 I e 1) P ( C 2 I e 2 U e 12) P ( e ) 
:::::::: P ( C 2 I e 2) P ( C 1 I e 1 U e 12) P ( e ). 
The underlying independence assumptions are that P ( C 1 I e 2) = P ( C r) and 
P ( C 2 I e t ) = P ( C 2). During control of inference, we use this in the following way. 
Let { C; } be a set of conflicted hypotheses, and let e = U e; be the total set of sup­
porting evidence for the C1• Use heuristics (e.g., most matches, highest total a priori 
n 
probability, etc .) to order the C;. Then form the evidence sets { e - U ek } for 
k =i i = 2 to n . This is a polynomial time operation. Then approximate 
n n 
P (.\C; I e ) :::::::: . n P ( cj I e - � e; ) = k. 
I I =1 k =1 +I 
k is interpreted as a measure of how likely the {C; } are all to be true, despite the 
conflict in evidence association. We use 1
�
k as the measure of conflict. If it is small, 
then the error in not dis-ambiguating the conflict (i.e., accrual skipping the conflicted 
level in the hierarchy) w ill be small. 
To see this, let AC; be associated to H, supported by e , in which, for conveni-
ence, we 
1 
have included �ei, f and 
I 
P(H IAC;,e)=P(e IH)P(H)/[P(ACi je)P(e)] 
t I 
p {AC; I H ,e ) = 1. We have the error in "skipping '' the level of the ci as 
I 
P (H I ACi e)- P (H I e ) 
i • 
P(e I H) P(H) p (e IH)P(H) -
P(ACi I e)P(c) p ( e ) 
I 
p (e IH)P(H) 1 
- 1 I p ( e ) P(ACi I· e ) 
I 
p (e IH)P(H) 1- P (AC1 I e ) I 
p ( e ) P (ACi I e ) 
I 
li2 
Then 
because 
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� P(e I H)P(H) ( 1 
k 
k
l p ( e ) 
which is small if 1�k is small. 
4. ISSUES 
Approximate hierarchical accrual provides a tool for choosing to ignore local 
conflicts in hierarchical inference. There are considerable issues in how to utilize it in 
the framework of system control. In this report we have presented a partial design for a 
probabilistic certainty calculus to support inference for military force inference. In the 
course of performing such inference, the step of exact conflict resolution will often be 
necessary. The inference control issue is how to decide when, in the face of conflict, to 
test for the use of approximate accrual and how to threshold the outcome of the test. 
The current design of a certainty calculus requires considerable effort in refinement 
and implementation. Large grain work chunks include: 
• Development of a control methodology to address computational combinatorics 
in the hierarchical inference evidence propagation and (approximate) conflict 
resolution. 
• Elicitation and verification of distributions characterizing the relative occurrence 
of military forces versus terrain and military contextual knowledge. 
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